Add to ORKGWe study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. Second, we disprove Aldershof et al.'s conjectures concerning employment by lotto for general matching markets
Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 20...
Complementarities pose problems in models of two-sided matching markets. This has been a longstandin...
We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We u...
We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable...
We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for th...
We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for th...
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable m...
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist...
This paper discusses the strategic manipulation of stable matching mechanisms. We provide a model of...
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable m...
Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if compleme...
mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econome-trica 58, 1475–1480, 1990)...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demand...
Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if compleme...
Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 20...
Complementarities pose problems in models of two-sided matching markets. This has been a longstandin...
We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We u...
We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable...
We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for th...
We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for th...
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable m...
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist...
This paper discusses the strategic manipulation of stable matching mechanisms. We provide a model of...
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable m...
Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if compleme...
mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econome-trica 58, 1475–1480, 1990)...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demand...
Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if compleme...
Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 20...
Complementarities pose problems in models of two-sided matching markets. This has been a longstandin...
We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We u...