Add to ORKGWe give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings
We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A stud...
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched...
We study stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college...
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defin...
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defin...
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish f...
A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave ...
Introduced by Gale and Shapley in 1962, the deferred acceptance algorithm has been applied to an arr...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comI analyze the admission mechanism used ...
In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospe...
One of the primary objectives of two-sided matching systems is to facilitate the pairing of two grou...
When a stable matching rule is used for a college admission market, questions on incentives facing a...
Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preference...
This thesis examines efficiency and fairness in matching markets. We first study a generalized many-...
The stable matching problem, first presented by mathematical economists Gale and Shapley, has been s...
We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A stud...
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched...
We study stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college...
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defin...
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defin...
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish f...
A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave ...
Introduced by Gale and Shapley in 1962, the deferred acceptance algorithm has been applied to an arr...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comI analyze the admission mechanism used ...
In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospe...
One of the primary objectives of two-sided matching systems is to facilitate the pairing of two grou...
When a stable matching rule is used for a college admission market, questions on incentives facing a...
Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preference...
This thesis examines efficiency and fairness in matching markets. We first study a generalized many-...
The stable matching problem, first presented by mathematical economists Gale and Shapley, has been s...
We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A stud...
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched...
We study stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college...