A System dynamics examination of the willingness of villagers to engage in illegal logging

Much of the work of illegal logging in Indonesia is carried out by villagers. Several factors determine villagers' willingness to participate in such activities. Chief among these are: (1) the need for income, (2) the fact that other villagers (and non-villagers) are already illegally logging, and (3) the realization of loss of community control over traditional forest areas. These factors form the basis of feedback loops, which trap villagers in illegal logging systems, which will likely result in the disappearance of a major source of livelihood. Ideas for system dynamics model structure were obtained from field reports and interviews with stakeholders. These ideas were examined using causal loop diagrams to represent different views of illegal logging. One village level view was formulated as a quantified system dynamics model using Vensim software. The model allows examination of scenarios, which might alter system behavior. The model is a tool for understanding consequences of various proposed strategies to control illegal logging. These strategies include enforcement of laws, strengthening of community rights, the prevention of outside labor in local forests, and the provision of alternate sources of income. This is part of a larger effort to describe and analyze illegal logging using system dynamics modelin