A contribution to Cyber-Security of Networked Control Systems: an Event-based Control Approach

In the present paper, a networked control system under both cyber and physical attacks is considered. An adapted formulation of the problem under physical attacks, data deception and false data injection attacks, is used for controller synthesis. Based on the classical fault tolerant detection (FTD) tools, a residual generator for attack/fault detection based on observers is proposed. An event-triggered and Bilinear Matrix Inequality (BMI) implementation is proposed in order to achieve novel and better security strategy. The purpose in using this implementation would be to reduce (limit) the total number of transmissions to only instances when the networked control system (NCS) needs attention. It is important to note that the main contribution of this paper is to establish the adequate event-triggered and BMI-based methodology so that the particular structure of the mixed attacked/faulty structure can be re-formulated within the classical FTD paradigm. Experimental results are given to illustrate the developed approach efficiency on a pilot three-tank system. The plant model is presented and the proposed control design is applied to the system