Forcing Them to Therapy:The Effect of Veto Players on Mediation Incidence

Do conflict parties’ characteristics influence mediation onset? Using the veto player theory, this study addresses the question why and under what circumstances mediation occurs. The predictions made by veto player theory correspond with why conflicts are, or become more intense and longer (Cunningham 2006). I argue that the number of veto players influences the cost-benefit calculations of conflict actors, as low numbers of veto players limit concession making, while high numbers of veto players exacerbate information asymmetries. Therefore, I test the hypothesis that the relationship between the number of veto players and mediation onset probability is curvilinear, with medium numbers of veto players increasing mediation incidence likelihood. Using data on mediation onsets in civil conflicts for the period 1946-2003, I find across different statistical model specifications that low and high numbers of veto players impede mediation onset. The models explain and predict mediation occurrence well, but are sensitive to model specifications, i.e. the exclusion of observations does not allow the model to reproduce the same results. The findings confirm the explanatory value of conflict costs and the benefits of a dyadic conflict analysis approach, yet suggest that more research on conflict actors’ characteristics is necessary to understand mediation