Analysis of decisions take by

Competition policy is an often subject of heated debate and criticism not only due to its con- troversial nature but also that is often advised by rival economic theories. Economic scholars are debating if it is difficult to determine whether the alleged significant lessening of competition in merger control is really there, and if so, whether there is indeed a net consumer detriment when the potential efficiency gains in mergers are taken into account. Likewise, in antitrust investigati- ons the argument is over disentangled alleged anticompetitive behaviour and its real impact on the welfare. This paper surveys European competition policy between 1990 and 2002, and seeks to identify those factors, which have a significant impact on decisions taken by the European Commission. By employing mathematical-statistical methods and considering a whole range of summary statistic, the article address issues regarding probability of positive findings - infringe- ments - and also impact of series of variables on probability of appeal of firms‘ which has been blamed by the Commission for wrong-doing. Despite the recent record-breaking fines imposed by the Commission in antitrust cases, and the fact that European competition law enforcement has important consequences for firms on the market, only a few analyses has been written to address these issues. This situation sharply corresponds with the situation in the US where this area is par- ticularly well depicted. This article is trying to provide a short analysis of recent European antitrust enforcement and fill the gap in this area