Bargaining Power and Takeover Premium

[[abstract]]以1984年至2014年美國上市公司併購案為樣本，探討公司議價能力與併購溢酬之間的關係。實證結果顯示議價能力與併購溢酬為顯著負相關。表示當公司議價能力越好所願意付給目標公司的價格越低，導致併購溢酬越低。另外考慮議價能力與併購型態、目標公司特徵的交互效果對於併購溢酬的影響。發現相對於同產業併購，主併公司議價能力對多角化併購溢酬的負向影響較小。當目標公司的規模越大，主併公司議價能力對併購溢酬的負向影響會越小。最後，探討主併公司議價能力對於併購後長期營運績效的影響，發現兩者為顯著正相關，顯示主併公司的議價能力能在併購後繼續發揮效果提升公司營運績效。[[abstract]]Using U.S. mergers over the period from 1984 to 2014 as a sample, this study establish a link between acquirer’s bargaining power and takeover premium. The results indicate that acquirers with greater bargaining power are unwilling to paid higher price to takeover targets. Further, merger type and target size are also considered in the association between bargaining power and takeover premium. We find that acquiring firms with greater bargaining power provide less influence on diversifying takeover premium relative to non-diversifying mergers. Additionally, the negative impact of acquirers’ bargaining power on takeover premium is weaker for large targets than small targets. Finally, I also examine the influence of bargaining power on post-merger operating performance. The results show that the post-merger operating performance improves significantly as bargaining power increases. The finding indicates that the bargaining power of acquiring firms can persistently provide positive influence on operating performance even after merger.[[note]]碩