We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. Previously it has been shown that, under some conditions on the distribution of votes, if the number of manipulators is o(√n), where n is the number of voters, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable by the coalition goes to zero as the number of voters goes to infinity, whereas if the number of manipulators is ω(√n), then the probability that a random profile is manipulable goes to one. Here we consider the critical window, where a coalition has size c√n, and we show that as c goes from zero to infinity, the limiting probability that a random profile is manipulable goes from zero to one in a smooth fashion, i.e., there is ...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators-voters who could change the e...
In voting problems where agents have lipschitz continuous utility functions on a multidimensional sp...
We investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be hard in a ...
We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules....
We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules....
Social choice is the study of the issues arising when a population of individuals attempts to combin...
International audienceWe consider a general framework for voting systems with arbitrary types of bal...
For any non-trivial voting system, there exists manipulable situations where a coalition of voters, ...
AbstractWe investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be ha...
Since any non-trivial voting system is susceptible to manipulation, we investigate how it is possibl...
International audienceWe investigate the possibility of designing a voting rule that both meets the ...
For centuries, it has been widely believed that the influence of a small coalition of voters is negl...
To the memory of Murat Sertel Abstract: Assuming the IC conjecture, we show that, for any faithful s...
In multiagent settings where the agents have di®erent preferences, preference aggregation is a cen-t...
We study coalitional manipulation of voting systems: can a subset of voters, by voting strategically...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators-voters who could change the e...
In voting problems where agents have lipschitz continuous utility functions on a multidimensional sp...
We investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be hard in a ...
We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules....
We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules....
Social choice is the study of the issues arising when a population of individuals attempts to combin...
International audienceWe consider a general framework for voting systems with arbitrary types of bal...
For any non-trivial voting system, there exists manipulable situations where a coalition of voters, ...
AbstractWe investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be ha...
Since any non-trivial voting system is susceptible to manipulation, we investigate how it is possibl...
International audienceWe investigate the possibility of designing a voting rule that both meets the ...
For centuries, it has been widely believed that the influence of a small coalition of voters is negl...
To the memory of Murat Sertel Abstract: Assuming the IC conjecture, we show that, for any faithful s...
In multiagent settings where the agents have di®erent preferences, preference aggregation is a cen-t...
We study coalitional manipulation of voting systems: can a subset of voters, by voting strategically...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators-voters who could change the e...
In voting problems where agents have lipschitz continuous utility functions on a multidimensional sp...
We investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be hard in a ...