We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast,...
This paper discusses the way that different operational characteristics including existing capacity,...
Time lags in switching operational modes are typical in the manufacturing and power sectors but are ...
This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless sign...
We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-...
We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-...
Start-up rms can have objectives that di¤er greatly from more established companies be-cause of the ...
We study competitive capacity investment for the emergence of a new market. Firms may invest either ...
We consider a long-term capacity investment problem in a competitive market under demand uncertainty...
Since a flexibility value emerges in waiting to expand capacity, the impact of demand uncertainty in...
This article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework. E...
Abstract: This paper considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and competitive fram...
This paper introduces a continuous-time game to study two ex ante identical firms ’ incentives in ca...
Even mature industries seldom settle down into a long-run steady state. Fluctuations in demand disru...
We model investments in capacity in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Ca...
This paper considers the investment decision of a firm where it has to decide about the timing and c...
This paper discusses the way that different operational characteristics including existing capacity,...
Time lags in switching operational modes are typical in the manufacturing and power sectors but are ...
This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless sign...
We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-...
We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-...
Start-up rms can have objectives that di¤er greatly from more established companies be-cause of the ...
We study competitive capacity investment for the emergence of a new market. Firms may invest either ...
We consider a long-term capacity investment problem in a competitive market under demand uncertainty...
Since a flexibility value emerges in waiting to expand capacity, the impact of demand uncertainty in...
This article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework. E...
Abstract: This paper considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and competitive fram...
This paper introduces a continuous-time game to study two ex ante identical firms ’ incentives in ca...
Even mature industries seldom settle down into a long-run steady state. Fluctuations in demand disru...
We model investments in capacity in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Ca...
This paper considers the investment decision of a firm where it has to decide about the timing and c...
This paper discusses the way that different operational characteristics including existing capacity,...
Time lags in switching operational modes are typical in the manufacturing and power sectors but are ...
This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless sign...