WITTGENSTEIN, WITTGENSTEINIANS AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

This dissertation is an attempt to discern the significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein\u27s later philosophy for the question of the epistemological status of religious belief, as well as a critical examination of selected contemporary philosophers who have addressed this issue from within a Wittgensteinian orientation. It has widely been thought that a fideistic position in religious epistemology follows from the lines of Wittgenstein\u27s later work. I examine and question this assumption. It has also been thought that Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion may be characterized as fideists. I show that this generalization masks interesting differences among the arguments regarding religious epistemology advanced by various Wittgensteinians. The plan of my investigation is twofold. First, I identify the themes or aspects of Wittgenstein\u27s thought that have been treated as relevant to questions about the justification of religious belief. These are: Wittgenstein\u27s conception of philosophy and of philosophical method; the concept of language-game; the expression form of life ; the remarks on religious belief recorded in the Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief; and Wittgenstein\u27s view of epistemology, as evidenced in On Certainty. I provide an exposition of each of these themes or aspects of Wittgenstein\u27s thought, along with critical comments and suggestions about their implications for religious epistemology. My emphasis in exposition is on the view of epistemology presented in On Certainity. Second, I critically examine the work of a number of philosophers who have attempted to formulate Wittgensteinian positions in religious epistemology. I find that each of these thinkers is best understood in light of his emphasis of one of the themes enumerated above. Therefore, W. D. Hudson is considered in light of his understanding of the concept of language-game; D. Z. Phillips, in connection with his preoccupation with the Lectures and Conversations on Religious Belief; and James Kellenberger, Norman Malcom, Jerry Gill, and Partick Sherry, in terms of their use of On Certainty. I show that the works of these individuals for the most part represent an array of arguments attempting to establish that a fideistic position in religious epistemology is intellectually respectable. I argue that these attempts, for various reasons, fail. Nonetheless, I find that there are instructive questions and valuable insights to be garnered from their discussion, and remain sensitive to their analyses in formulating my own view. My investigation of Wittgenstein\u27s thought and my survey of the work of philosophers influenced by it culminates in my own assessment of the implications of Wittgenstein\u27s later philosophy for the issue of religious epistemology. I sketch what I take to be the most promising line of inquiry into this matter. My view, which is not a fideistic one, is formulated largely on the basis of my reading of On Certainty. I foresee problems even in the approach I recommend, however, and conclude with the judgement that because Wittgenstein\u27s thought is best conceived as illuminating out experience of the empirical world, rather than as providing insights into anything that purportedly transcends this world, the value of his thought for work in religious epistemology will prove to be limited