Add to ORKGI shall defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address an objection against the very possibility of experiencing mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the kind of experience by which we access mind-independence
Naïve realism, often overlooked among philosophical theories of perception, has in recent years attr...
A brief description of phenomenology and of its relation to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy
Abstract When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be im...
I shall defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the...
I shall defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the...
I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-...
Can one refute Berkeleyan phenomenalism by arguing that sensory objects seem mind-independent, and t...
I discuss a thesis that I call 'The Appearance of Mind-Independence', to the effect that, to the sub...
Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the obj...
I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in qu...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...
Six arguments against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis are reviewed....
I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and halluci...
Naïve realism, often overlooked among philosophical theories of perception, has in recent years attr...
A brief description of phenomenology and of its relation to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy
Abstract When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be im...
I shall defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the...
I shall defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the...
I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-...
Can one refute Berkeleyan phenomenalism by arguing that sensory objects seem mind-independent, and t...
I discuss a thesis that I call 'The Appearance of Mind-Independence', to the effect that, to the sub...
Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the obj...
I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in qu...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...
Six arguments against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis are reviewed....
I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and halluci...
Naïve realism, often overlooked among philosophical theories of perception, has in recent years attr...
A brief description of phenomenology and of its relation to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy
Abstract When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be im...