Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first
Emotions are always about something and are thus intentional. Emotional fittingness is a normative c...
This paper argues against the correctness of the more popular -first views (fittingness first, reaso...
This essay defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I a...
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because...
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to val...
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to val...
This book has two main aims. First, it develops and defends a constitutive account of normative reas...
This is chapter 5 of the book project _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, i...
The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the rel...
The reasons first approach holds that all other normative concepts can be explained by reasons. It p...
It is tempting to think that all of normativity, such as our reasons for action, what we ought to do...
This paper draws on the ‘Fitting Attitudes’ analysis of value to argue that we should take the conce...
This paper argues that the recent metaethical turn to reasons as the fundamental units of normativit...
Normative reasons for attitudes are facts that count in favor of those attitudes, but a fact can fav...
It has become common to take reasons to form a basic normative category that is not amenable to non-...
Emotions are always about something and are thus intentional. Emotional fittingness is a normative c...
This paper argues against the correctness of the more popular -first views (fittingness first, reaso...
This essay defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I a...
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because...
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to val...
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to val...
This book has two main aims. First, it develops and defends a constitutive account of normative reas...
This is chapter 5 of the book project _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, i...
The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the rel...
The reasons first approach holds that all other normative concepts can be explained by reasons. It p...
It is tempting to think that all of normativity, such as our reasons for action, what we ought to do...
This paper draws on the ‘Fitting Attitudes’ analysis of value to argue that we should take the conce...
This paper argues that the recent metaethical turn to reasons as the fundamental units of normativit...
Normative reasons for attitudes are facts that count in favor of those attitudes, but a fact can fav...
It has become common to take reasons to form a basic normative category that is not amenable to non-...
Emotions are always about something and are thus intentional. Emotional fittingness is a normative c...
This paper argues against the correctness of the more popular -first views (fittingness first, reaso...
This essay defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I a...
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