Stalnaker argued that conditional excluded middle should be included in the principles that govern counterfactuals on the basis that intuitions support that principle. This is because there are pairs of competing counterfactuals that appear to be equally acceptable. In doing so, he was forced to introduced semantic vagueness into his system of counterfactuals. In this paper it is argued that there is a simpler and purely epistemic explanation of these cases that avoids the need for introducing semantic vagueness into the semantics for counterfactuals
Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2008) have defended the validity of counterfactual hypothetical syll...
This paper does two things. First, it defends, against a potential threat to it, the claim that a ca...
Counterfactuals such as If the world did not exist, we would not notice it have been a challenge for...
Stalnaker argued that conditional excluded middle should be included in the principles that govern ...
Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals...
This article explores the connection between two theses: the principle of conditional excluded middl...
In this chapter we consider three philosophical perspectives (including those of Stalnaker and Lewis...
The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle has been a matter of longstanding controversy in both s...
Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2008) have defended the validity of counterfactual hypothetical syll...
Conditional excluded middle (CEM) is the following principe of counterfactual logic: either, if it w...
This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European ...
In a series of articles, David Barnett (2006, 2009, 2010) has developed a general theory of conditio...
I explore the logic of the conditional, using credence judgments to argue against Duality and in fav...
Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2008) have defended the validity of counterfactual hypothetical syll...
This paper does two things. First, it defends, against a potential threat to it, the claim that a ca...
Counterfactuals such as If the world did not exist, we would not notice it have been a challenge for...
Stalnaker argued that conditional excluded middle should be included in the principles that govern ...
Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals...
This article explores the connection between two theses: the principle of conditional excluded middl...
In this chapter we consider three philosophical perspectives (including those of Stalnaker and Lewis...
The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle has been a matter of longstanding controversy in both s...
Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2008) have defended the validity of counterfactual hypothetical syll...
Conditional excluded middle (CEM) is the following principe of counterfactual logic: either, if it w...
This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European ...
In a series of articles, David Barnett (2006, 2009, 2010) has developed a general theory of conditio...
I explore the logic of the conditional, using credence judgments to argue against Duality and in fav...
Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2008) have defended the validity of counterfactual hypothetical syll...
This paper does two things. First, it defends, against a potential threat to it, the claim that a ca...
Counterfactuals such as If the world did not exist, we would not notice it have been a challenge for...