Add to ORKGIn this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists
In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for reject...
Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the con...
The current orthodoxy in cognitive science, what I describe as a commitment to deep repres...
In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Ca...
This is a chapter from my introductory book *Perception* covering the representational view of exper...
This paper elaborates on an argument in my book *Perception*. It has two parts. In the first part, I...
I criticise a recent variety of argument for the representational theory of experience, which holds ...
The representationist maintains that an experience represents a state of affairs. To elaborate, a s...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...
This paper examines the contents of perceptual experience, and focuses in particular on the relation...
In this paper, a distinction is made between descriptive and demonstrative ineffability of the pheno...
In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for reject...
Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the con...
The current orthodoxy in cognitive science, what I describe as a commitment to deep repres...
In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Ca...
This is a chapter from my introductory book *Perception* covering the representational view of exper...
This paper elaborates on an argument in my book *Perception*. It has two parts. In the first part, I...
I criticise a recent variety of argument for the representational theory of experience, which holds ...
The representationist maintains that an experience represents a state of affairs. To elaborate, a s...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...
This paper examines the contents of perceptual experience, and focuses in particular on the relation...
In this paper, a distinction is made between descriptive and demonstrative ineffability of the pheno...
In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for reject...
Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the con...
The current orthodoxy in cognitive science, what I describe as a commitment to deep repres...