Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works
There are two widely held assumptions about perception: ascriber-independence (the view that the fac...
Naïve Realists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious relation to an object and its property...
What is at stake in the debate on whether experience should be understood as having content? This qu...
Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenom...
A straightforward way of thinking about perception is in terms of perceptual representation. Percept...
The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I exp...
It has long been a common assumption that perceptual experience has representational content. Yet, i...
Many philosophers and scientists take perceptual experience, whatever else it involves, to be repres...
I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain...
I criticise a recent variety of argument for the representational theory of experience, which holds ...
In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differenc...
The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even th...
There are two widely held assumptions about perception: ascriber-independence (the view that the fac...
Naïve Realists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious relation to an object and its property...
What is at stake in the debate on whether experience should be understood as having content? This qu...
Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenom...
A straightforward way of thinking about perception is in terms of perceptual representation. Percept...
The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I exp...
It has long been a common assumption that perceptual experience has representational content. Yet, i...
Many philosophers and scientists take perceptual experience, whatever else it involves, to be repres...
I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain...
I criticise a recent variety of argument for the representational theory of experience, which holds ...
In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differenc...
The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even th...
There are two widely held assumptions about perception: ascriber-independence (the view that the fac...
Naïve Realists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious relation to an object and its property...
What is at stake in the debate on whether experience should be understood as having content? This qu...
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