In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply are evidence that one ought to ϕ, and suggest that “evidence” in this context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion
Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal a...
This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evident...
peer reviewedThis paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bi...
In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply...
This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis con...
In this article, I argue against Kearns and Star’s reasons-as-evidence view, which identifies normat...
In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We ...
In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We ...
Oaksford & Chater (O&C) aim to provide teleological explanations of behavior by giving an appropriat...
This is part of an authors meets critics session on Daniel Star's wonderful book, Knowing Better. I ...
Abstract: Oaksford & Chater (O&C) aim to provide teleological explanations of behavior by gi...
Abstract: Oaksford & Chater (O&C) aim to provide teleological explanations of behavior by gi...
The idea that normative statements implicitly refer to standards has been around for quite some time...
Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal a...
This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evident...
peer reviewedThis paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bi...
In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply...
This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis con...
In this article, I argue against Kearns and Star’s reasons-as-evidence view, which identifies normat...
In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We ...
In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We ...
Oaksford & Chater (O&C) aim to provide teleological explanations of behavior by giving an appropriat...
This is part of an authors meets critics session on Daniel Star's wonderful book, Knowing Better. I ...
Abstract: Oaksford & Chater (O&C) aim to provide teleological explanations of behavior by gi...
Abstract: Oaksford & Chater (O&C) aim to provide teleological explanations of behavior by gi...
The idea that normative statements implicitly refer to standards has been around for quite some time...
Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal a...
This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evident...
peer reviewedThis paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bi...
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