We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that investors cannot monitor markets continuously. We study how limit order markets absorb transient liquidity shocks, which occur when a significant fraction of investors lose their willingness and ability to hold assets. We characterize the equilibrium dynamics of market prices, bid-ask spreads, order submissions and cancelations, as well as the volume and limit order book depth they generate
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris n° 728/2001 et CEPR Discussion Series n° 2889/2001We develop...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2004.Includes bi...
This paper analyzes the interaction between liquidity traders and informed traders in a dynamic mode...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
We propose a dynamic equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that investors s...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
This paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, symmetrically informed ...
International audienceThis paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, s...
International audienceThis paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, s...
International audienceWe develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liqu...
International audienceWe develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liqu...
International audienceWe develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liqu...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris n° 728/2001 et CEPR Discussion Series n° 2889/2001We develop...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2004.Includes bi...
This paper analyzes the interaction between liquidity traders and informed traders in a dynamic mode...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
We propose a dynamic equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that investors s...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that...
This paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, symmetrically informed ...
International audienceThis paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, s...
International audienceThis paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, s...
International audienceWe develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liqu...
International audienceWe develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liqu...
International audienceWe develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liqu...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris n° 728/2001 et CEPR Discussion Series n° 2889/2001We develop...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2004.Includes bi...
This paper analyzes the interaction between liquidity traders and informed traders in a dynamic mode...