This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game. It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always decrease rent-seeking efforts. These conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also prudent. Under n = 2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared to risk-neutrality. An intuition for this result is given based on a self-protection model
This paper studies the comparative statics regarding changes in risk on Nash's solution to bargainin...
We revisit the well-known result that asserts that an increase in the degree of one's risk aversion ...
This note shows that there exists a threshold level of optimal prevention for a risk neutral agent w...
This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking\ud game. It derives conditions so that ...
International audienceThis paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game It derives c...
We consider a strategic contest game in which risk-averse agents exert efforts to increase their sha...
We consider a strategic contest game in which risk-averse agents exert efforts to increase their sha...
The effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent-seeking contests: (1...
Yamazaki (2009) proves that if each player's measure of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing in ...
In this paper, we show that equilibrium in a rent-seeking contest uniquely exists for a class of het...
Across many forms of rent seeking contests, the impact of risk aversion on equilibrium play is indet...
We formulate one-stage and two-stage rent seeking games with endogenously determined rent. Under rea...
This paper analyzes which type of intrinsic preferences drive an agent s behavior in a sequential pu...
In infinitely repeated games, we also give definitions to risk attitude and reputation. As art infin...
This paper analyzes which type of intrinsic preferences drive an agent’s behavior in a sequential pu...
This paper studies the comparative statics regarding changes in risk on Nash's solution to bargainin...
We revisit the well-known result that asserts that an increase in the degree of one's risk aversion ...
This note shows that there exists a threshold level of optimal prevention for a risk neutral agent w...
This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking\ud game. It derives conditions so that ...
International audienceThis paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game It derives c...
We consider a strategic contest game in which risk-averse agents exert efforts to increase their sha...
We consider a strategic contest game in which risk-averse agents exert efforts to increase their sha...
The effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent-seeking contests: (1...
Yamazaki (2009) proves that if each player's measure of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing in ...
In this paper, we show that equilibrium in a rent-seeking contest uniquely exists for a class of het...
Across many forms of rent seeking contests, the impact of risk aversion on equilibrium play is indet...
We formulate one-stage and two-stage rent seeking games with endogenously determined rent. Under rea...
This paper analyzes which type of intrinsic preferences drive an agent s behavior in a sequential pu...
In infinitely repeated games, we also give definitions to risk attitude and reputation. As art infin...
This paper analyzes which type of intrinsic preferences drive an agent’s behavior in a sequential pu...
This paper studies the comparative statics regarding changes in risk on Nash's solution to bargainin...
We revisit the well-known result that asserts that an increase in the degree of one's risk aversion ...
This note shows that there exists a threshold level of optimal prevention for a risk neutral agent w...
Add to ORKG