The framing of decision situations : automatic goal selection and rational goal pursuit

Orthodox versions of Rational Action Theory postulate the maximization of a situation-invariant utility measure as the mechanism that underlies human behaviour. This postulate - as powerful as it is for predicting behaviour in a multitude of applications - limits the scope of Rational Action Theory. In this book, it is argued that several phenomena of natural interest to sociologists, like normative behaviour or problems of self-command, cannot be addressed adequately in the orthodox framework because they rely on cognitive automatisms that operate in a non-maximizing manner. As an alternative, a cognitive variant of Rational Action Theory is elabvorated: Framing Theory. here, maximizing behaviour - in the form of rational goal pursuit - occurs only locally, after the content of the goal is identified. This goal identification, also called the framing of decision situation, is driven by mechanisms like mental inertia and situation triggering that are incompatible with globally maximizing behaviour. Next to the theoretical foundation of Framing Theory in the psychological and cognitive sciences, a family of stochastic models is proposed that can directly express the core notions of the theory. By fitting these models to choice data, frames can be assessed quantitatively, and predictions of Framing Theory can be tested in a convenient way. The theory is exemplarily applied to the social dillema domain. In an experimental public goods game, the effect of a sanctioning system on individual cooperation, and the mediating role of framing, are studied. Finally, in a series of three small experimental studies, the possibilities and limitations of Framing Theory as a descriptive model of human decision making are assessed.