summary:Modeling several competitive leaders and followers acting in an electricity market leads to coupled systems of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints, called equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). We consider a simplified model for competition in electricity markets under uncertainty of demand in an electricity network as a (stochastic) multi-leader-follower game. First order necessary conditions are developed for the corresponding stochastic EPEC based on a result of Outrata. For applying the general result an explicit representation of the co-derivative of the normal cone mapping to a polyhedron is derived. Then the co-derivative formula is used for verifying constraint qualifications and for identi...
We formulate a two-settlement equilibrium in competitive electricity markets as a subgame-perfect Na...
Abstract: We analyze a two-stage game of strategic firms facing uncertain demand and exerting market...
Many of the European energy markets are characterized by dominant players that own a large share of ...
Modeling several competitive leaders and followers acting in an electricity market leads to coupled ...
summary:Modeling several competitive leaders and followers acting in an electricity market leads to ...
We consider an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) arising from the modeling of ...
We consider an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) arising from the mo...
This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market an...
This paper presents a two stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) ...
We study the equilibria reached by strategic producers in a pool-based network-constrained electrici...
This paper aims to presents dynamic stochastic an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (...
A model of two-settlement electricity markets is introduced, which accounts for flow con-gestion, de...
Recent work has shown that the profit maximizing problem for a generator in a competitive electricit...
A model of two-settlement electricity markets is introduced, which accounts for flow congestion, dem...
In this paper, we consider the characterization of strong stationary solutions to equilibrium proble...
We formulate a two-settlement equilibrium in competitive electricity markets as a subgame-perfect Na...
Abstract: We analyze a two-stage game of strategic firms facing uncertain demand and exerting market...
Many of the European energy markets are characterized by dominant players that own a large share of ...
Modeling several competitive leaders and followers acting in an electricity market leads to coupled ...
summary:Modeling several competitive leaders and followers acting in an electricity market leads to ...
We consider an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) arising from the modeling of ...
We consider an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) arising from the mo...
This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market an...
This paper presents a two stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) ...
We study the equilibria reached by strategic producers in a pool-based network-constrained electrici...
This paper aims to presents dynamic stochastic an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (...
A model of two-settlement electricity markets is introduced, which accounts for flow con-gestion, de...
Recent work has shown that the profit maximizing problem for a generator in a competitive electricit...
A model of two-settlement electricity markets is introduced, which accounts for flow congestion, dem...
In this paper, we consider the characterization of strong stationary solutions to equilibrium proble...
We formulate a two-settlement equilibrium in competitive electricity markets as a subgame-perfect Na...
Abstract: We analyze a two-stage game of strategic firms facing uncertain demand and exerting market...
Many of the European energy markets are characterized by dominant players that own a large share of ...