Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in the one-shot Cournot game. Allowing for infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation can increase firm profits as it improves cartel stability
This paper analyzes upstream firms’ collusive sustainability when downstream firms adopt the relativ...
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among tw...
We consider a duopoly in which each firm has one owner and one manager playing a multi-stage delegat...
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in ...
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show how strategic delegation in the one-shot Cournot g...
In amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no ...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of ...
Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers’ (1985) Cournot model of strategic delegation to an i...
We consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of collus...
We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming th...
The gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the pric...
This article analyses cartels that act as a Stackelberg leader with respect to a competitive fringe ...
This paper analyzes upstream firms’ collusive sustainability when downstream firms adopt the relativ...
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among tw...
We consider a duopoly in which each firm has one owner and one manager playing a multi-stage delegat...
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in ...
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show how strategic delegation in the one-shot Cournot g...
In amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no ...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of ...
Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers’ (1985) Cournot model of strategic delegation to an i...
We consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of collus...
We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming th...
The gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the pric...
This article analyses cartels that act as a Stackelberg leader with respect to a competitive fringe ...
This paper analyzes upstream firms’ collusive sustainability when downstream firms adopt the relativ...
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among tw...
We consider a duopoly in which each firm has one owner and one manager playing a multi-stage delegat...
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