Rorty and Davidson on Truth

(in English): Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson are (at least verbally) in agreement on many essential topics in the philosophy of language, including their rebuttal of the correspondence theory of truth, the impossibility to define truth and the untenability of both the scheme-content distinction and the dichotomy between realism and anti-realism. Yet substantial differences remain, as represented especially by Davidson's insistence on the importance of objective truth and by Rorty's idiosyncratic pragmatism. The task of this thesis is to identify Rorty and Davidson's mutual differences more precisely and find out whether their philosophical projects might in the end prove compatible or if, on the contrary, their broad agreement is only apparent. With this end in view, the thesis traces the concept of truth in the hands of both philosophers with a special focus on Davidson's concept of objective truth. I conclude that Rorty systematically misinterprets Davidson as far as the latter concept is concerned. However, as both Davidson and Rorty remain hostile to treating truth as a normative concept, this need not mean that their views are completely incompatible