In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the upstream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that firms prefer to deal exclusively with retailers. If the extent of consumers' heterogeneity is small, manufacturers offer exclusive contracts unilaterally. On the other hand, if consumers' valuations differ significantly both manufacturers engage in exclusive contracting
This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor. ...
This paper analyses manufacturers' choice of vertical arrangement with retailers. We focus on two ty...
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a...
In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically ...
The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with r...
The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with r...
It is shown in this study that in the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competiti...
Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive duopolies. First we show that ...
This article shows how vertical restraints, which affect intrabrand competition, can and will be use...
We consider a manufacturer’s incentive to sell through an independent retailer, rather than directly...
We study a model where an endogenous number of competing manufacturers located around a circle contr...
This paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction bet...
We study the optimal contract choice of an upstream monopolist producing an essential input that may...
This paper shows that a retailer may choose to differentiate his supplying producer from his rival’s...
This paper shows that a retailer may choose to differentiate his supplying producer from his rival's...
This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor. ...
This paper analyses manufacturers' choice of vertical arrangement with retailers. We focus on two ty...
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a...
In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically ...
The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with r...
The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with r...
It is shown in this study that in the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competiti...
Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive duopolies. First we show that ...
This article shows how vertical restraints, which affect intrabrand competition, can and will be use...
We consider a manufacturer’s incentive to sell through an independent retailer, rather than directly...
We study a model where an endogenous number of competing manufacturers located around a circle contr...
This paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction bet...
We study the optimal contract choice of an upstream monopolist producing an essential input that may...
This paper shows that a retailer may choose to differentiate his supplying producer from his rival’s...
This paper shows that a retailer may choose to differentiate his supplying producer from his rival's...
This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor. ...
This paper analyses manufacturers' choice of vertical arrangement with retailers. We focus on two ty...
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a...
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