It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms. We instead argue that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert-identification of relevant rivals and the event-study methodology, we find rivals generally experience positive abnormal returns at the merger announcement date. Further, we find that the stock reaction of rivals to merger events is not sensitive to merger waves; hence, 'future acquisition probability' does not drive the positive abnormal returns of rivals. We then build a conceptual framework that encompasses the impact of merger events on both merging and rival firms in order to provide a schematic to e...
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning t...
The dissertation is composed of five independent chapters. The first one is a brief introduction to ...
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning t...
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms...
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms...
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms...
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms...
"It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firm...
"It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firm...
This thesis aims to add to the difficult issue of announcement returns in rivals of acquisition tar...
"The strategic management literature has found it difficult to differentiate between collusive and e...
Mergers and acquisitions research has principally focused on attributes of the acquiring firm and po...
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and henc...
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and henc...
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and henc...
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning t...
The dissertation is composed of five independent chapters. The first one is a brief introduction to ...
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning t...
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms...
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms...
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms...
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms...
"It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firm...
"It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firm...
This thesis aims to add to the difficult issue of announcement returns in rivals of acquisition tar...
"The strategic management literature has found it difficult to differentiate between collusive and e...
Mergers and acquisitions research has principally focused on attributes of the acquiring firm and po...
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and henc...
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and henc...
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and henc...
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning t...
The dissertation is composed of five independent chapters. The first one is a brief introduction to ...
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning t...