Add to ORKGFor games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce's (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players h...
A game in strategic form is strict dominance solvable if iterative elimination of strictly dominated...
We introduce a new concept which extends von Neumann and Morgenstern's maximin strategy solution by ...
For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) sho...
Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mix...
Two new properties of a finite strategic game, strong and weak BR-dominance solvability, are introdu...
Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provid...
Moulin (1984) describes the class of nice games for which the solution concept of point-rationalizab...
In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players --- allowing players to be imp...
In this paper, we consider the notion of $\alpha-$ robust equilibrium for finite strategic players i...
By a result of Pearce (1984), in a finite strategic form game, the set of a player's serially undomi...
This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions for finite normal form games under the assu...
We consider zero-sum and a non zero-sum games of two players with generalized, not necessarily linea...
AbstractIf a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best resp...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players h...
A game in strategic form is strict dominance solvable if iterative elimination of strictly dominated...
We introduce a new concept which extends von Neumann and Morgenstern's maximin strategy solution by ...
For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) sho...
Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mix...
Two new properties of a finite strategic game, strong and weak BR-dominance solvability, are introdu...
Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provid...
Moulin (1984) describes the class of nice games for which the solution concept of point-rationalizab...
In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players --- allowing players to be imp...
In this paper, we consider the notion of $\alpha-$ robust equilibrium for finite strategic players i...
By a result of Pearce (1984), in a finite strategic form game, the set of a player's serially undomi...
This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions for finite normal form games under the assu...
We consider zero-sum and a non zero-sum games of two players with generalized, not necessarily linea...
AbstractIf a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best resp...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players h...
A game in strategic form is strict dominance solvable if iterative elimination of strictly dominated...
We introduce a new concept which extends von Neumann and Morgenstern's maximin strategy solution by ...