Add to ORKGNegotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities
Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze’s (1982) ultimatum game result is replicated with mean earnings of ...
We propose a simple mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two ...
A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration,...
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale inte...
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Inte...
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Inte...
This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether ...
Anger is an emotion frequently experienced in negotiations. However, the effect of anger in negotiat...
Negotiating parties oftentimes do not reach mutually beneficial agreements. A considerable body of r...
We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the r...
We show that delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance ra...
keeping all of the money for themselves to giving all of it away, and any division in between. Once ...
A recurring puzzle in bargaining experiments is that individuals under-exploit their bargaining posi...
The present study aims for a better understanding of how individuals’ behavior in monetary price neg...
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to investigate the intrapersonal effects of anger suppression...
Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze’s (1982) ultimatum game result is replicated with mean earnings of ...
We propose a simple mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two ...
A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration,...
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale inte...
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Inte...
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Inte...
This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether ...
Anger is an emotion frequently experienced in negotiations. However, the effect of anger in negotiat...
Negotiating parties oftentimes do not reach mutually beneficial agreements. A considerable body of r...
We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the r...
We show that delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance ra...
keeping all of the money for themselves to giving all of it away, and any division in between. Once ...
A recurring puzzle in bargaining experiments is that individuals under-exploit their bargaining posi...
The present study aims for a better understanding of how individuals’ behavior in monetary price neg...
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to investigate the intrapersonal effects of anger suppression...
Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze’s (1982) ultimatum game result is replicated with mean earnings of ...
We propose a simple mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two ...
A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration,...
