Add to ORKGUsing panel data, this paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as interruptions of IMF programs around election dates in the recipient countries. Compliance with World Bank conditionality is lower in election years and pre-election years. Using a proxy for IMF program interruptions it is shown that breakdowns are less likely in election years. However, no other political factors seem to influence interruptions and compliance systematically. The paper concludes with implications for reform
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is infamous for its structural adjustment programs, requiring ...
In this paper we analyze whether IMF conditionality is exclusively designed in line with observable ...
Following calls for a more disaggregated approach to studying the consequences of IMF programs, scho...
Using panel data, this paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as i...
Using panel data, this paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as i...
Der Verfasser versucht, auf der Basis von Panel-Daten eine Erklaerung fuer die Befolgung von Weltban...
article tries to explain interruptions of IMF programmes around election dates in the recipient coun...
The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain ...
'The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain...
The paper develops a model explaining why IMF programs are less likely to be concluded before nation...
Why do governments fail to implement policy commitments in contractual agreements with international...
Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies - notab...
A common feature in programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the use of conditionalities...
Using panel data for 106 countries in 1971-1997, we estimate generalized least squares regressions t...
What accounts for the differences in implementation of IMF programs across countries and across poli...
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is infamous for its structural adjustment programs, requiring ...
In this paper we analyze whether IMF conditionality is exclusively designed in line with observable ...
Following calls for a more disaggregated approach to studying the consequences of IMF programs, scho...
Using panel data, this paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as i...
Using panel data, this paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as i...
Der Verfasser versucht, auf der Basis von Panel-Daten eine Erklaerung fuer die Befolgung von Weltban...
article tries to explain interruptions of IMF programmes around election dates in the recipient coun...
The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain ...
'The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain...
The paper develops a model explaining why IMF programs are less likely to be concluded before nation...
Why do governments fail to implement policy commitments in contractual agreements with international...
Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies - notab...
A common feature in programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the use of conditionalities...
Using panel data for 106 countries in 1971-1997, we estimate generalized least squares regressions t...
What accounts for the differences in implementation of IMF programs across countries and across poli...
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is infamous for its structural adjustment programs, requiring ...
In this paper we analyze whether IMF conditionality is exclusively designed in line with observable ...
Following calls for a more disaggregated approach to studying the consequences of IMF programs, scho...