Political feasibility of emission trading systems may crucially depend on the free initial allocation of emission allowances to energy-intensive industries in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects. We investigate the potential trade-off between such compensation and economic efficiency for alternative allocation rules where emission allowances are based on either emissions or output. Based on analytical partial equilibrium and numerical general equilibrium analysis, we show that in open trading systems the trade-off becomes the more severe, the higher the international permit price is. Whenever the permit price can be considered exogenous to firms or industries, the output-based allocation rule is distinctly less cos...
Allocation of emission allowances may affect firms' incentives to invest in clean technologies. In t...
This paper presents a political-economy analysis of allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading...
The allocation of tradable emissions permits has important efficiency as well as distributional effe...
Political feasibility of emission trading systems may crucially depend on the free initial allocatio...
The choice of mechanism for allocating tradable emissions permits has important efficiency and distr...
This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The a...
In 2005, an EU-wide emissions trading scheme covering major CO2 producing sites shall come into powe...
Cap and trade mechanisms enjoy increasing importance in environmental legislation worldwide. The mos...
In this paper we investigate how restrictions for emission trading to the energy-intensive power sec...
Energy markets and energy-intensive industries in all EU member states – especially in Germany – are...
I examine the welfare effects of emission permit trading in an economy where the use of energy in pr...
Not all possible distributions of a given total of emission permits are compatible with the attainme...
This paper investigates the economic consequences of permits allocation rules. Following the rapid d...
As part of the Kyoto agreement on limiting carbon emissions, from 2008 onwards an international mark...
Allocation of emission allowances may affect firms' incentives to invest in clean technologies. In t...
This paper presents a political-economy analysis of allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading...
The allocation of tradable emissions permits has important efficiency as well as distributional effe...
Political feasibility of emission trading systems may crucially depend on the free initial allocatio...
The choice of mechanism for allocating tradable emissions permits has important efficiency and distr...
This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The a...
In 2005, an EU-wide emissions trading scheme covering major CO2 producing sites shall come into powe...
Cap and trade mechanisms enjoy increasing importance in environmental legislation worldwide. The mos...
In this paper we investigate how restrictions for emission trading to the energy-intensive power sec...
Energy markets and energy-intensive industries in all EU member states – especially in Germany – are...
I examine the welfare effects of emission permit trading in an economy where the use of energy in pr...
Not all possible distributions of a given total of emission permits are compatible with the attainme...
This paper investigates the economic consequences of permits allocation rules. Following the rapid d...
As part of the Kyoto agreement on limiting carbon emissions, from 2008 onwards an international mark...
Allocation of emission allowances may affect firms' incentives to invest in clean technologies. In t...
This paper presents a political-economy analysis of allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading...
The allocation of tradable emissions permits has important efficiency as well as distributional effe...