Some writers have urged that evolutionary theory produces generalizations that hold only ceteris paribus, that is, provided “everything else is equal.” Others have claimed that all laws in the special sciences, or even all laws in science generally, hold only ceteris paribus. However, if we lack a way to determine when everything else really is equal, hedging generalizations with the phrase ceteris paribus renders those generalizations vacuous. I propose a solution to this problem for the case of causal equations from classical population genetics. When coupled with the right proviso, equations in classical population genetics function as strict laws
Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some f...
Earman and Roberts propose to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical ge...
Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some f...
Some writers have urged that evolutionary theory produces generalizations that hold only ceteris par...
In this paper I criticize the commonly accepted idea that the generalizations of the special science...
Law-like generalisations hedged with a ceteris paribus-clause such as widely in use in psychology, t...
An otherwise lawlike generalisation hedged by a ceteris paribus (CP) clause qualifies as a law of na...
Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental ph...
An otherwise law-like generalisation hedged by a ceteris paribus (CP) clause quali-fies as a law of ...
Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental physics) are ...
Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible ...
The causal nature of evolution is one of the central topics in the philosophy of biology. It has bee...
Earman and Roberts propose to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical ge...
Special science generalizations admit of exceptions. Among the class of non-exceptionless special sc...
Earman and Roberts propose to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical ge...
Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some f...
Earman and Roberts propose to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical ge...
Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some f...
Some writers have urged that evolutionary theory produces generalizations that hold only ceteris par...
In this paper I criticize the commonly accepted idea that the generalizations of the special science...
Law-like generalisations hedged with a ceteris paribus-clause such as widely in use in psychology, t...
An otherwise lawlike generalisation hedged by a ceteris paribus (CP) clause qualifies as a law of na...
Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental ph...
An otherwise law-like generalisation hedged by a ceteris paribus (CP) clause quali-fies as a law of ...
Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental physics) are ...
Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible ...
The causal nature of evolution is one of the central topics in the philosophy of biology. It has bee...
Earman and Roberts propose to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical ge...
Special science generalizations admit of exceptions. Among the class of non-exceptionless special sc...
Earman and Roberts propose to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical ge...
Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some f...
Earman and Roberts propose to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical ge...
Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some f...