Institutional turmoil and strike activity in Korea

The economic strike literature focuses on rational actors engaging in strike activity to increase their economic outcome. A separate literature emphasizes institutional, behavioural and political reasons for strike activity. While these literatures are rarely integrated, we posit that micro-level institutional turmoil, indexed by the presence of intra-firm union rivalries or outside third-party provo-cateurs, and the maturity of the bargaining relationship, are important determi-nants of economic strike activity. In three new micro-level data sets from Korea, micro-level institutional turmoil is found to be significantly related to strike activity. Laws regulating collective bargaining in Korea date back to the end of the Korean Conflict, 1953. These statutes parallel the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act in the United States, but until recently the lack of enforcement reduced them to empty pronouncements. In 1980, new legislation made it even easier for the state and businesses to thwart collective bargaining (Kearney, 1991). This changed in 1987 when Korea took an important step toward free collective bargaining (Bognanno