A Test of an Efficiency Model of Grievance Activity

The authors develop a model in which the extent of use of a grievance system is determined by wage premiums and alternative job opportuni-ties. Specifically, they hypothesize that when workers enjoy compara-tively high wages or are faced with poor alternative job opportunities, they are less likely to use withdrawal mechanisms that might lead to dismissal (such as shirking or absenteeism) and more likely to use grievance procedures to address workplace problems. The results of an analysis of data for the year 1982 from a large manufacturing company are consistent with this hypothesis. EMPLOYEE grievances are one of the most common measures used to evaluate the level of conflict between workers and man-agement and the overall state of employee relations. There has been little conclusive research on the causes of grievances, how-ever, and none of the published studies on the subject consider the role that factors out-side the organization, such as labor market conditions, might play in determining the rate of grievances. In this paper we develop a simple model in which the extent of use of the grievance system to resolve conflicts is determined by wage premiums and alterna-tive job opportunities. The model is tested using data for 1982 taken from a large multi-plant manufacturing company