When Harms Become Wrongs Some Comments on the Moral Language of "Oppression " and the Limitations of Moral Theory

This article explores some of the moral language of oppression, especially as it rests on a distinc-tion between harms and wrongs. Authentic instances of oppression are always wrongful, but might not be harmful in certain cases. The analytic challenge is to determine when an allegation of oppres-sion is true or merits public attention as opposed to when allegations of oppression are not socially compelling. Because the language of oppression frequently looks to rights, those controversies that sur-round rights legislation or its creation also affect and complicate our understanding of oppression. An especially difficult question is how much burden would be "reasonable " for X to bear if creating a right for Y imposes a burden on X—such as having to pay additional taxes to make public transportation accessible. This article suggests that moral theory cannot provide an answer. Rather, this question can only be answered according to the potential that exists for a social consensus that such and such a bur-den ought to be borne. When that consensus occurs, however, then so has moral progress occurred. Consequently, rather than connoting a heightened capacity for ethical reflection and analysis, moral progress is better understood as a politically based sensibility that moves from socioeconomic narcis-sism and class isolationism toward social inclusion and tolerating social difference. Like murder, rape, and arson, the moral connotations of op