Sanctions as Coercive Diploimacy: The U.S. President's Decision-_ _ to Initiate Economic Sanctions

While economic sanctions are widely believed to be ineffective policy instruments, their use has increased in recent years. Scholars have ana-lyzed the question of sanction effectiveness, but few have approached the conditions that lead to their employment. This article addresses that question: what conditions lead a country to initiate economic sanctions? Focusing on the U.S., both the relations with the target country and the domestic political and economic conditions in America are considered as factors leading to the imposition of economic sanctions. Time-series-cross-section data from 50 countries between 1966-1992 show that the president considers both the relations with the target and American domestic factors when deciding to initiate economic sanctions. However, the relationship with the target is the largest stimulus to sanction use, while the domestic factors only marginally influence the decision. The analysis highlights the importance of economic sanctions as a form of coercive diplomacy aimed at the target and not a White House reaction to domestic demands for action. In the past few decades, increased economic interdependence, the desire to avoid the costs of military force, and increased international cooperation through the United Nations have made economic sanctions an attractive option for states wanting to coerce other states. With the increased use, especially in the past few NOTE: I would like to thank Steve Chan, Margaret Doxey, Melanie Taylor Drury, Cliff Morgan, Steve Saideman, and Steve Walker for their particularly helpful comments on previous drafts of this article; their suggestions have enhanced its quality All remaining errors are my own. A previous version was presented at the annual meetings of the International Studies Associa