Oxford University Press. How to Criticize Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Law

These excellent volumes show both the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary and serious Dworkin scholarship (Hershowitz 2006; Ripstein 2007). Mostly the arti-cles are new, although Susan Hurley’s paper in the Hershowitz volume was first published in 1990. As to be expected with work on Dworkin, the division between political and legal theory is not distinct because – as is well-known – he integrates moral problems of politics both into the choice of legal theory and legal argument itself. But, some issues may be separated and since there are excellent essays on both equality of resources and the relevance of ‘intrinsic ’ values, I have separated my discussion into the two heads of ‘legal theory ’ and ‘political theory’. Work on his political theory is not as advanced as it is on his legal theory and so I have largely directed my attention to the latter. I conclude that the most profitable work with Dworkin’s legal theory lies in exploring the idea of the ‘interpretive concept ’ and its connection with moral ideals, and in assessing the moral weight of integrity, particu-larly against the ideals of justice and fairness. Almost all the essays on legal theory show awareness of difficulties concerning these two issues although no one takes o