Christianity: A Critique of the Rational Choice Theory of Religion from a Weberian and Comparative Religions Perspective

The rational choice theorists of religion have attempted to build upa body of transcultural, universalistic generalizations, be~nning with basic axioms ofhuman rationality. The problematics of the perspective's analytical focus on one type of rationality are ma & evident by a comparison u,ith Max Weber's types of action. The influence of the American reli~ous experience is evident in the perspective's formulations and explanations, and conceptual and theoretŸ problems arise when th perspective is applied to non.westem reli~on. The relationstª between otherwor/d/:y rewards and supernatural beings proposed by the theory has to bemodified with respect o eastem religions. Monopolista and pluralism take on clifferent meanings in eastern reli~ous contexts, and variaaons in state regulations have different consequermes from those in the west. Like rational choice theorists in other areas of study, rational choice theorists of religion have attempted to build up a body of generalizations which are transcultural nd transhistorical. They have adopted methodological individ-ualista, and beginning with the axiom that Ÿ choose in accord with what is of optimal utility for them, they have followed a logico-deductive mode of theorizing characterized by a high level of formularization of definitions and propositions. They write that they are perfectly aware that individuals do not always act rationally, but they claim that their simplifying assumptions and ideal-typical models can generate high-level explanations (Stark and Finke 2000:36-41; Iannaccone 1997). There are a number of general critiques of rational choice theory (Hindess 1988; Mouzelis 1991:146-53, 1995:28-40) which may well be relevant o the application of the perspective to the field of religion. It has been argued, for example, that when rational choice theorists refuse to take into accoun