The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it explains what a constitutivist the-ory of reasons is and why the theory promises to deliver the holy grail of moral philosophy, which is an argument to the conclusion that each of us would choose to act morally if we had and exercised the capacity to respond rationally to the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Second, it de-scribes the various parts of a constitutivist theory of reasons, and it explains how these parts give support to the premises required for the promised ar-gument
Moral constitutivism purports to explain moral normativity by appeal to the nature of either agency ...
I argue in this paper that there is a structural analogy between the problem of moral reasons (Smith...
Abstract in UndeterminedIn this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according t...
This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify c...
A focal point in recent work on practical reason is the idea that we might ground normative claims i...
Can the question “Why do what morality requires?” be answered in such a way that anyone regardless o...
Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which th...
This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how ...
Constitutivism is a kind of metaethical theory according to which one can explain reasons or normati...
Morality seems important, in the sense that there are practical reasons — at least for most of us, m...
This paper explores the isomorphism between two relationships. The first is that between reasons and...
This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of ...
Why be moral? According to constitutivism, there are features constitutive of agency, actual or idea...
Consequentialist theories often neglect reasons for action. They offer theories of the rightness or ...
Moral constitutivism purports to explain moral normativity by appeal to the nature of either agency ...
I argue in this paper that there is a structural analogy between the problem of moral reasons (Smith...
Abstract in UndeterminedIn this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according t...
This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify c...
A focal point in recent work on practical reason is the idea that we might ground normative claims i...
Can the question “Why do what morality requires?” be answered in such a way that anyone regardless o...
Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which th...
This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how ...
Constitutivism is a kind of metaethical theory according to which one can explain reasons or normati...
Morality seems important, in the sense that there are practical reasons — at least for most of us, m...
This paper explores the isomorphism between two relationships. The first is that between reasons and...
This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of ...
Why be moral? According to constitutivism, there are features constitutive of agency, actual or idea...
Consequentialist theories often neglect reasons for action. They offer theories of the rightness or ...
Moral constitutivism purports to explain moral normativity by appeal to the nature of either agency ...
I argue in this paper that there is a structural analogy between the problem of moral reasons (Smith...
Abstract in UndeterminedIn this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according t...