Article Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Conscious Ill Will

Implicit bias is defined, in part, by a lack of intent. Yet the implicit attitudes literature has made little contact with research on the experience of conscious will, which suggests that the feeling of conscious intent is an inference rather than a direct report of how actions are caused. We tested the hypothesis that inferences about one’s intentions shape whether an automatically activated attitude is endorsed explicitly. In a first study, individuals who perceived their attitudes toward gay men to be intended showed stronger implicit–explicit correspondence. In a second study, we manipulated perceptions of intent. Inferences that implicit bias was intended caused participants to express those biases on an explicit measure. A third study replicated the experimental effects and found that metacognitions of intent were especially influential among individuals who were motivated to be unprejudiced. Results suggest that metacognitive inferences about intent can shape whether automatically activated bias becomes explicitly endorsed prejudice. Keywords implicit bias, implicit attitudes, homophobia, illusion of conscious will, automatic, controlled processing Implicit bias is by definition unintended. Although explicit atti-tudes are deliberately expressed, implicit attitudes may come to mind and affect behavior even despite intentions to the con