Institutional and Individual Influences on the President’s Veto

This article evaluates and compares “president ” and “presidency ” centered explanations of presi-dential activity with respect to one important presidential power, the veto. Using individual bill data for nine congresses characterized by divided party government, I estimate a logistic regression model of presidential vetoes. This contrasts with previous research, which has used annual aggre-gate data. Using individual bill data allows controls for objectionable legislation passed by Con-gress and enables me to measure and compare the “propensity to veto ” of different presidents. I conclude that presidential vetoes are in substantial measure caused by Congress passing objection-able bills, but that even controlling for congressional behavior, presidents exhibit strikingly differ-ent veto behavior. Ford was most prone to using the veto, and Reagan, the least. Although external factors exert great influence on the president’s veto decision, the individual choices and strategies of presidents also have an important influence. A paradox of the American presidency is that this office, routinely called the most powerful on Earth, is also said by many observers to allow its incumbent relatively little autonomy. Neustadt (1960) asked whether the president was a “leader or clerk. ” Similarly, recent work has focused on “president ” versus “pres