The Optimal Equilibrium Capacity of Information Hiding Based on Game Theory

Abstract—Game theory could be used to analyze the conflicted issues in the field of information hiding. In this paper, 2-phase game can be used to build the embedder-attacker system to analyze the limits of hiding capacity of embedding algorithms: the embedder minimizes the expected damage and the attacker maximizes it. In the system, the embedder first consumes its resource to build embedded units (EU) and insert the secret information into EU. Then the attacker distributes its resource evenly to the attacked EU. The expected equilibrium damage, which is maximum damage in value from the point of view of the attacker and minimum from the embedder against the attacker, is evaluated by the case when the attacker attacks a subset from all the EU. Furthermore, the optimal equilibrium capacity of hiding information is calculated through the optimal number of EU with the embedded secret information. Finally, illustrative examples of the optimal equilibrium capacity are presented