Emotions as cognitive-affective-somatic hybrids

From a philosophical and a psychological point of view, emotions are not theoretical states; they involve practical concerns, associated with readi-ness to act. Since emotions are evaluative attitudes, involving a positive or a negative stance towards the object, they also entail either taking action or being disposed to act in a manner compatible with the evaluation. Ben-Ze’ev (2002, p. 84) In the first part of this article I will use the noun “emotion ” to describe topics that arise in the discussion of such “somethings” as “anger, ” “jealousy, ” “joy, ” and so on, but not such “some-things ” as “nausea, ” “pain, ” and so on. However, as the argument progresses it will become more and more obvious that the use of the word “emotion ” as a noun is so replete with misleading impli-cations, just from its grammatical role alone, that a case will emerge for dropping it from the discussion of these vital human experiences, such as being angry, falling in love, being envious