A Defense of Intentional Realism

A defense of realism with regard to the propositional attitudes is undertaken. It is argued that we have propositional attitudes and that propositional attitudes cause behavior. The positions of two opposing theorists- Jerry Fodor and Daniel Dennett- are discussed in detail. Fodor's language of thought hypothesis regarding the propositional attitudes supports realism; whereas Dennett is often taken to endorse anti-realism. It is argued that the language of thought hypothesis is false, and that a Dennettian approach to the propositional attitudes is largely correct. It is further argued that, in spite of Dennett's "anti-realist " label, a Dennettian approach can support realism with regard to the propositional attitudes. Thesis Supervisor: Alex Byrne Title: Assistant Professor of Philosophy I want to defend a certain kind of intentional realism; that is, the following two theses: (1) We have propositional attitudes. (2) They cause behavior. I want to do this by looking at two theories of what the propositional attitudes are