Add to ORKGAbstract We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. We propose a monitored semantics for this calculus, which blocks the execution of processes as soon as they attempt to leak information. We illustrate the use of our monitored semantics with various examples, and show that the induced safety property implies a noninterference property studied previously
Abstract. We develop a theory of noninterference for a typed version of the ss-calculus where types ...
In large-scale distributed infrastructures, applications are realised through communications among d...
AbstractGiven a program that has access to some private information, how can we ensure that it does ...
Abstract We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. ...
We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. We propos...
International audienceWe consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels f...
In large-scale distributed infrastructures, applications are realised through com- munications among...
Abstract. We propose a formal model of runtime safety enforcement for large-scale, cross-language di...
Abstract. We propose a formal model of runtime safety enforcement for large-scale, cross-language di...
Process calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been very successf...
International audienceWe consider a calculus for multiparty sessions with delegation, enriched with ...
Abstract. In large-scale distributed infrastructures, applications are re-alised through communicati...
This paper presents a technique for verifying secure information flow in concurrent programs consist...
AbstractThe security π-calculus is a typed version of the asynchronous π-calculus in which the types...
We develop a theory of noninterference for a typed version of the \u3c0- calculus where types are us...
Abstract. We develop a theory of noninterference for a typed version of the ss-calculus where types ...
In large-scale distributed infrastructures, applications are realised through communications among d...
AbstractGiven a program that has access to some private information, how can we ensure that it does ...
Abstract We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. ...
We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. We propos...
International audienceWe consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels f...
In large-scale distributed infrastructures, applications are realised through com- munications among...
Abstract. We propose a formal model of runtime safety enforcement for large-scale, cross-language di...
Abstract. We propose a formal model of runtime safety enforcement for large-scale, cross-language di...
Process calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been very successf...
International audienceWe consider a calculus for multiparty sessions with delegation, enriched with ...
Abstract. In large-scale distributed infrastructures, applications are re-alised through communicati...
This paper presents a technique for verifying secure information flow in concurrent programs consist...
AbstractThe security π-calculus is a typed version of the asynchronous π-calculus in which the types...
We develop a theory of noninterference for a typed version of the \u3c0- calculus where types are us...
Abstract. We develop a theory of noninterference for a typed version of the ss-calculus where types ...
In large-scale distributed infrastructures, applications are realised through communications among d...
AbstractGiven a program that has access to some private information, how can we ensure that it does ...