ALAN DONAGAN MORAL ABSOLUTISM AND THE DOUBLE-EFFECT EXCEPTION: REFLECTIONS ON JOSEPH BOYLE'S WHO IS ENTITLED TO DOUBLE EFFECT?

ABSTRACT. Joseph Boyle raises important questions about the place of the double-effect exception in absolutist moral theories. His own absolutist theory (held by many, but not all, Catholic moralists), which derives from the principles that fundamental human goods may not be intentionally violated, cannot dispense with such exceptions, although he rightly rejects some widely held views about what they are. By contrast, Kantian absolutist theory, which derives from the principle that lawful freedom must not be violated, has a corollary-that it is a duty, where possible, to coerce those who try to violate lawful freedom- which makes superfluous many of the double-effect exceptions Boyle allows. Other implications of the two theories are contrasted. Inter alia, it is argued that, in Boyle's theory, that a violation of a fundamental human good can be viewed as a cost proportionate to a benefit obtained, cannot yield a double-effect exception to the prohibition of intentionally violating that good, because paying a cost cannot be unintentional. Key Words: cost-benefit analysis, double effect, intention, side effect Most Catholic moralists, especially those who have to do with the practice of medicine, have long accepted that some moral prohibi-tions are not absolute, but admit exceptions when what is puta-tively prohibited because of a bad effect has a counterbalancing good effect. In recent years their doctrine has attracted much interest and some favor among secular non-Catholics. Moralists influenced by Kant, however, tend to resist 'double-effecf excep-tions as superfluous. The issues are confusing, because not only are theories of the double-effect exception various, but so also are theories according to which it is superfluous. Joseph Boyle's illuminating exploration of some of the theories in the field, both Catholic and non-Catholic, and his exposition and persuasiv