Political influence and bureaucratic autonomy

Abstract The establishment of autonomous public bodies during the past two decades has created a highly fragmented public sector. Using a dataset with more than 200 Dutch public sector organisations, this article examines three related sets of questions: to what extent a relationship exists between formal and de facto autonomy; the level of influence that interested parties exert upon those organizations; whether a relationship exists between levels of formal and de facto autonomy and the level of influence exercised by these parties. We find that formal autonomy does not reinforce de facto autonomy; organizations with less autonomy report higher levels of political influence when policy autonomy is concerned; and that organizations with more autonomy report higher societal influence on their financial autonomy. Keywords Bureaucratic autonomy. Political control. Public sector organizations The political control of public administration is one of the most central concerns of students of politics and administration since the days of Wilson and Weber. On both sides of the Atlantic, fear of unresponsive and runaway bureaucracy has prompted several research endeavors in the past century leading to much bureaucrat-bashing (Niskanen 1971). Ironically, the implementation of a neo-liberal agenda within the public sector, i.e. privatizations, liberalization and New Public Management, further deepened skepticism about responsive bureaucracy instead of bringing the bureaucrat under control—which was the alleged objective. Political reformers hived off departmental units from ministries, created highly specialized organiza-tions, and delegated substantial degrees of autonomy to these bodies (Pollitt an