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We study a model of sequential decision making under uncertainty by a population of agents. Each agent prior to making a decision receives a private signal regarding a binary underlying state of the world. Moreover she observes the actions of her last K immediate predecessors. We discriminate between the cases of bounded and unbounded informativeness of private signals. In contrast to the literature that typically assumes myopic agents who choose the action that maximizes the probability of making the correct decision (the decision that identifies correctly the underlying state), in our model we assume that agents are forward looking, maximizing the discounted sum of the probabilities of a correct decision from all the future agents including theirs. Therefore, an agent when making a decision takes into account the impact that this decision will have on the subsequent agents. We investigate whether in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this model individual's decisions converge to the correct state of the world, in probability, and we show that this cannot happen for any K and any discount factor if private signals&apos