Add to ORKGWe show that every N-player K1 × · · · × KN game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least ∏N i=1Ki − 1 − ∑N i=1Ki(Ki − 1) zero entries. In particular, the largestN-playerK× · · ·×K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games
In this paper, we develop an adaptive discretization method for computing correlated equilibria in n...
Abstract. We characterize the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as the Nash equilibria ...
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polyn...
We show that every N-player K1 ×... × KN game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least ∏N i=...
This paper establishes and interprets a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of (countab...
We prove that every undiscounted multi-player stopping game in discrete time admits an approximate c...
We prove that in every normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an app...
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players h...
This paper deals with the complexity of computing Nash and correlated equilib-ria for a finite game ...
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility f...
International audienceThis paper deals with the complexity of computing Nash and correlated equilibr...
We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to pe...
This paper is concerned both with the comparative geometry of Nash and correlated equilibria, and wi...
A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is appl...
We prove that in every normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an app...
In this paper, we develop an adaptive discretization method for computing correlated equilibria in n...
Abstract. We characterize the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as the Nash equilibria ...
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polyn...
We show that every N-player K1 ×... × KN game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least ∏N i=...
This paper establishes and interprets a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of (countab...
We prove that every undiscounted multi-player stopping game in discrete time admits an approximate c...
We prove that in every normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an app...
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players h...
This paper deals with the complexity of computing Nash and correlated equilib-ria for a finite game ...
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility f...
International audienceThis paper deals with the complexity of computing Nash and correlated equilibr...
We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to pe...
This paper is concerned both with the comparative geometry of Nash and correlated equilibria, and wi...
A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is appl...
We prove that in every normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an app...
In this paper, we develop an adaptive discretization method for computing correlated equilibria in n...
Abstract. We characterize the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as the Nash equilibria ...
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polyn...