Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 47 (2014), 139-158. The Sorites Meets the Many*

The objective of this paper is to understand certain issues that come up once we recognize that a good number of natural language predicates are indeterminate in two different ways. For example, the predicate ’is a mountain ’ is both vague and susceptible to the problem of the many. Throughout the paper I focus on how to distinguish these two kinds of indeterminacy, and on a certain problem that supervaluationism has when it is recognized that a single predicate can be vague and susceptible to the problem of the many. The problem is that supervaluation-ism loses its ability to capture our intuitions concerning sharp cut-offs. Finally, I offer a solution to this problem. Key words: philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, vagueness, the problem of the many, semantic indeterminacy, supervaluationism. Resumen El objetivo de este artículo es entender ciertas cuestiones que surgen cuando reconocemos que un buen número de predicados del lenguaje natural son indeterminados de dos maneras diferentes. Por ejemplo, el predicado ‘es una montaña’ es vago y susceptible al problema de los muchos. A lo largo de este artículo me enfocaré en cómo distinguir estos dos tipos de indeterminación, y en un problema que el supervaluacionism