COMMONS AND COLLECTIVES: THE LACK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CENTRAL

Current debate about land and agrarian reform in the post-Soviet Central Asian republics tends to be couched in terms of stark choices between state, collective and private ownership, whether of land, livestock, or operating capital. There is little discussion of the full range of potential tenure arrangements in the 'middle ground ' between private and state ownership, including the possibility of common (endogenously evolved) as opposed to collective (exogenously imposed) forms of property, yet recent research suggests these may become increasingly important in the region in the near future. Part of the problem, this paper argues, is semantic: the meaning of terms such as 'collective action ' and 'common property ' has been tainted in the post-Soviet context by association with the failed experience of agricultural collectivisation. But the problem is also substantive. Relations of trust and reciprocity, and other features of what has come to be known as 'social capital', emerge as a essential precondition for successful land and agrarian reform, yet in the aftermath of agricultural collectivisation appear to be lacking precisely where it is most needed. This paper first outlines an approach to distinguishing modes of operation of groups in society. Next, two empirical case studies from Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan are offered in order to shed light on some of the institutional challenges faced in the contemporary process of land and agrarian reform. They illustrate how the lack of social capital currently presents a major obstacle to successful economic transition. The paper concludes with some reflections on theory and suggests questions for further research