Czy pierwotne ego ma charakter historyczny?

The article concerns the problem of time, and methodological grounds of investigating historicity in Husserl’s philosophy. The article has a polemical character, i.e., it discusses with theses presented by Saulius Geniusas in the Husserl’s Notion of the Primal Ego in Light of the Hermeneutical Critique. I argue, that the general tendency of Geniusas’ questions requires an enlargement, at least with regard to his analyses of Dieter Lohmar’s “functional reading” of the primal ego, because the problem itself leads one to the following question: Is it possible to reduce the hermeneutical critique of phenomenology to a mere question about the legitimacy of the analyses of the primal ego? I emphasizes that such a critique is not necessary, instead one has to understand the critique as being involved in the methodological status of historical questioning. Additionally, I claim that the question of history of the ego involves an another level of constitution than the level of temporalization, about which Geniusas in fact asks in his article. Lastly, I assert that the question about historicity of the ego presupposes a certain order of constitution; with regard to the order more “primal” level is “earlier” than the “later” level. The way of questioning, however, leads to the problem of regressus in infinitum. After the critical remarks, I enlarges Geniusas’ most interesting and promising aspect of the problem of the primal ego, viz., the problem of transcendental naiveté. By introducing the problem, as I argue, a phenomenologist is confronted with the necessity of redoing reduction