Abstract: This paper examines the effect of introducing positive loading factors into insurance premia, in insurance markets consisting of groups of individuals in different risk categories. It is shown that that such loading factors may have far-reaching effects on insurance market equilibria
We examine the effect of background risk on competitive insurance markets with moral hazard. If poli...
The aim of this paper is to investigate optimal combinations of risk management mechanisms and prici...
This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its custo...
The theory of adverse selection in insurance markets has been enormously influential among scholars,...
The theory of adverse selection in insurance markets has been enormously in-fluential among scholars...
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of imperfectly categorizing risks in the insurance indu...
[[abstract]]This paper analyzes equilibrium health insurance premium dependencies on signaling costs...
Adverse selection and moral hazard are two effects of incomplete information in the market for healt...
International audienceWe provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adve...
Most competitive models of insurance markets under asymmetric information predict a positive relatio...
This paper analyzes equilibrium health insurance premium dependencies on signaling costs given indiv...
We propose a game-theoretic model to study various effects of scale in an insurance market. After rev...
Albert Satorra and the participants to the 30th EGRIE conference for their questions and comments. A...
This dissertation investigates several aspects of the economics of insurance markets. First, condit...
Three economic issues in property/casualty insurance are examined in this thesis. Chapter 2 explore...
We examine the effect of background risk on competitive insurance markets with moral hazard. If poli...
The aim of this paper is to investigate optimal combinations of risk management mechanisms and prici...
This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its custo...
The theory of adverse selection in insurance markets has been enormously influential among scholars,...
The theory of adverse selection in insurance markets has been enormously in-fluential among scholars...
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of imperfectly categorizing risks in the insurance indu...
[[abstract]]This paper analyzes equilibrium health insurance premium dependencies on signaling costs...
Adverse selection and moral hazard are two effects of incomplete information in the market for healt...
International audienceWe provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adve...
Most competitive models of insurance markets under asymmetric information predict a positive relatio...
This paper analyzes equilibrium health insurance premium dependencies on signaling costs given indiv...
We propose a game-theoretic model to study various effects of scale in an insurance market. After rev...
Albert Satorra and the participants to the 30th EGRIE conference for their questions and comments. A...
This dissertation investigates several aspects of the economics of insurance markets. First, condit...
Three economic issues in property/casualty insurance are examined in this thesis. Chapter 2 explore...
We examine the effect of background risk on competitive insurance markets with moral hazard. If poli...
The aim of this paper is to investigate optimal combinations of risk management mechanisms and prici...
This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its custo...